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Abstract –We present a model that explores the influence of persuasion in a population of agents
with positive and negative opinion orientations. The opinion of each agent is represented by
an integer number k that expresses its level of agreement on a given issue, from totally against
k = −M to totally in favor k =M . Same-orientation agents persuade each other with probability
p, becoming more extreme, while opposite-orientation agents become more moderate as they
reach a compromise with probability q. The population initially evolves to (a) a polarized state
for r = p/q > 1, where opinions’ distribution is peaked at the extreme values k = ±M , or (b) a
centralized state for r < 1, with most opinions around k = ±1. When r ≫ 1, polarization lasts for
a time that diverges as rM lnN , where N is the population’s size. Finally, an extremist consensus
(k =M or −M) is reached in a time that scales as r−1 for r ≪ 1.
Introduction. – Many empirical investigations show
the importance of social influence in the formation of peo-
ple’s opinions. For instance, it is argued that two inter-
acting partners may exert social pressure to change their
attitudes to conform each other [1]. Some physics mod-
els have incorporated this particular social mechanism by
means of a compromise process [2–5]. In these models,
opinions are represented by a real number between two
extreme values, and pair of individuals interact only if
their opinion difference is smaller than a given threshold.
Individuals resolve the conflict by reaching a compromise,
in which both opinions are changed in the same amount
to reduce their difference. A less explored mechanism of
social interactions is the persuasive arguments exchange
[6–9]. As observed by Myers [6] in group discussion exper-
iments, when two individuals talk, they do not only state
their opinions, but they also discuss about the arguments
that support their opinions. Then, if they already hold
the same opinion orientation, they could intensify their
opinions by persuading each other with new arguments or
reasons, becoming more extreme in their believes. This
mechanism was proposed by Lau and Murnighan [8] af-
ter the works by Myers [6] and Isenberg [7], and recently
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explored by Ma¨s et al. [9] using a computational model.
In this letter, we introduce a simple model that explores
the competition between the compromise and persuasive-
argument mechanisms in a population of N interacting
agents. The state of each agent is represented by an inte-
ger number k (−M ≤ k ≤ M and k 6= 0), where the sign
of k indicates its opinion orientation, like for instance to
be in favor (positive) or against (negative) marijuana le-
galization, and the absolute value |k| measures its opinion
intensity or strength. Thus, k = M (−M) correspond to
extremists which are strongly in favor (against) of legaliza-
tion, while k = 1 and −1 represent moderates. In a time
step, two agents with states j and k are picked at random
to interact. Then, their states are updated according to
two elemental processes (see Fig. 1).
(i) Compromise: if they have opposite orientations, their
intensities decrease in one unit with probability q:
• If j < 0 and k > 0 ⇒ (j, k)→ (jr, kl) with prob. q
• If j > 0 and k < 0 ⇒ (j, k)→ (jl, kr) with prob. q.
If j = ±1 and k = ∓1, one switches orientation at random:
(±1,∓1)→
{
(1, 1) with prob. q/2
(−1,−1) with prob. q/2.
(ii) Persuasion: if they have the same orientation, their
intensities increase by one unit with probability p:
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• If j < 0 and k < 0 ⇒ (j, k)→ (jl, kl) with prob. p
• If j > 0 and k > 0 ⇒ (j, k)→ (jr, kr) with prob. p.
Here kr and kl denote the right and left neighboring states
of k, respectively, defined as
kr =


1 for k = −1
M for k = M
k + 1 otherwise.
kl =


−1 for k = 1
−M for k = −M
k − 1 otherwise.
j
−1 1 k
−1 1j+1 k−1
q
j k
k+1j+1
p
Fig. 1: Two main processes of the model: (Left) Compro-
mise: two interacting agents with opposite opinion orientation
become more moderate. (Right) Persuasion: two interacting
agents with the same orientation become more extremists.
With this dynamics, opinions are constrained to the
interval [−M,M ] and the neutral opinion k = 0 is ex-
cluded. We find that the population’s opinion settles in a
centralized state when the compromise process dominates
(q > p), and in a polarized state when persuasion domi-
nates (p > q). These states are not stable, and the sys-
tem ultimately reaches extremist consensus. We solve the
equations for the dynamics in the stationary state, and
also in the strong and small persuasion limits, and find
that the mean extremist consensus time is non-monotonic
in the ratio p/q.
We note that similar mechanisms to the compromise
process (i) are found in nonlinear and multiple-state voter
models with a reinforcement rule [10–15], in which agents
switch orientation (opinion’s sign) only after receiving
multiple inputs of agents with the opposite orientation.
Besides, persuasion was used in recent works [16, 17] as
a degree of a person’s self-conviction, where in addition
to the influence from others, a person takes into account
its own opinion when making a decision. Also, persuasion
between opposite-orientation agents was recently studied
in [15]. However, we understand that the mechanism of
strengthening of opinions due to same-orientation inter-
actions has not been investigated within an interacting
particle model.
Dynamics. – We study the dynamics of the system
by looking at the time evolution of the number of agents
in the different opinion states. We denote by xk(t) the
fraction of agents in state k at time t. Initially, states
are uniformly distributed, thus xk(t = 0) ≃ 1/2M . Fig-
ure 2 shows results from Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
for M = 5 and a population of size N = 109. Given that
qualitative results depend on the ratio r ≡ p/q that relates
the persuasion and compromise time scales, we show two
representative cases, one with r = 3 [Fig. 2(a)] and the
other with r = 1/3 [Fig. 2(b)]. We observe that densities
xk reach a nearly constant value (plateau) that depends on
k, but eventually all xk decay to zero, except xM that goes
to 1, corresponding to a consensus in the extremist state
M . The two extremists consensus x±M = 1 are absorb-
ing states of the system, thus they are the only possible
final states in the long run. The length of the plateau in-
creases with the system size as lnN (not shown), a typical
time scale that appears in models with intermediate states
[10, 14]. We shall see that this particular scaling is also a
consequence of the discrete nature of the system when a
small initial asymmetry is introduced [14].
The structure of the population at the quasistationary
state or plateau shows interesting properties, as can be
seen in Fig. 3 where we plot xk for a given time in the
plateau. The distribution of opinions depends on the ratio
r, which controls the relative frequency of persuasion and
compromise events. When r > 1, the persuasion process
dominates over compromise, driving the states of agents
towards the extreme opinions k = ±M . This induces opin-
ion polarization, where xk is symmetric and peaked at the
opposite extreme values [see Fig. 3(a)]. Instead, for r < 1
compromise events occur more often than persuasive en-
counters, thus most opinions accumulate around the mod-
erate values k = ±1, inducing a centralized opinion state
where xk has a maximum value at center states [see Fig.
3(b)].
Stationary states. – To gain an insight about these
observations, we write and analyze a set of ordinary differ-
ential equations for the time evolution of xk. Here we con-
sider for simplicity the large N limit, where demographic
noise coming from system size fluctuations is neglected.
Then, the densities of positive states evolve according to
the following set of equations
dx1
dt
= 2 (x−1 q − x1 p)σ+ + 2q (x2 − x1)σ− (1a)
dxk
dt
= 2p (xk−1 − xk)σ+ (1b)
+ 2q (xk+1 − xk)σ− for 2 ≤ k ≤M − 1
dxM
dt
= 2p xM-1 σ+ − 2q xM σ−, (1c)
where σ+ =
∑M
k=1 xk and σ− =
∑−M
k=−1 xk are the to-
tal densities of positives and negatives states, respec-
tively, which satisfy the density conservation constraint
σ+ + σ− = 1. Equations for negative-state densities are
obtained from Eqs. (1) by the transformations k ↔ −k
and σ+ ↔ σ−. The gain and loss terms in the rate
equations account for the different processes. The first
term describes persuasive interactions between two posi-
tive agents, while the second term accounts for the com-
promise between positive and negative agents. In addi-
tion, the gain term 2q x−1 σ+ in Eq. (1a) corresponding to
p-2
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Fig. 2: Time evolution of the fraction of agents in different
opinion states, for maximum opinion intensity M = 5 in a
population of N = 109 agents. (a) xk(t) for p = 3/4 and q =
1/4. (b) xk(t) for p = 1/4 and q = 3/4. Solid (dashed) curves
correspond to positive (negative) opinions. A logarithmic scale
was used in the y-axis to clearly see all plateaus together.
−1→ 1 transitions, describes the negative to positive flux
of states, while the absence of the loss term −2p xM σ+
and the gain term 2q xM+1 σ− in Eq. (1c) reflect the fact
that there is no state flux through the k =M boundary.
The properties of the quasistationary distributions of
Fig. 3 can be obtained by studying the stationary solu-
tions of Eqs. (1). The two trivial solutions xM = 1 and
x-M = 1 correspond to the M and −M extremists consen-
sus, respectively, where all agents end up with the same
maximum opinion intensity. These are stable fixed points
in the space of densities. But there is also a non-trivial so-
lution that corresponds to a balanced mix of positive and
negative agents, as the ones in Fig. 3. Setting dxkdt = 0
and σ+ = σ− = 1/2 in Eqs. (1) we obtain a linear sys-
tem of algebraic equations that can be solved by iteration.
The solutions are xsk = x
s
1 r
k−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ M and xsk =
xs−1 r
−k−1 for −M ≤ k ≤ −1, with r = p/q. Using the
normalization condition 1/2 = σ+ =
∑M
k=1 xk =
x1(1−r
M )
(1−r)
and 1/2 = σ− =
∑−M
k=−1 xk =
x
−1(1−r
M)
(1−r) , we obtain the
values
xs1 = x
s
−1 =
1− r
2(1− rM )
. (2)
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Fig. 3: Distribution of opinions’ densities at the quasistation-
ary mixed state of Fig. 2, and for the same parameter values.
(a) xk at time t = 200. (b) xk at t = 20. Solid lines correspond
to expression (3).
Finally, densities at the quasistationary mixed state are
xsk =
1
2
(
1− r
1− rM
)
r|k|−1 for −M ≤ k ≤M. (3)
In Fig. 3 we observe that expression (3) in solid lines
gives a good mathematical description of the opinions’
distributions from MC simulations, in a population of
agents whose opinions are polarized (r > 1) or central-
ized (r < 1).
To study the stability of these states we have integrated
Eqs. (1) numerically for M = 5 and two values of r. The
time evolution is very similar to the one depicted in Fig. 2.
We mimic the initial state of MC simulations by taking
xk(t = 0) = 1/2M + ǫ, where |ǫ| = N
−1/2 corresponds to
a stochastic size fluctuation respect to the uniform state.
All densities quickly reach a nearly constant value in time,
corresponding to the mixed solution xsk of Eq. (3), and
stay very close to this attractor for a time that scales as
lnN , to finally reach either fixed point x±M = 1. The
attractor xsk corresponds to a saddle point of the dynamics
- starting from the exact uniform state xk(t = 0) = 1/2M
(or any symmetric case xk = x−k) causes the system to hit
xsk, and stay there. But any small initial asymmetry, for
instance in the positive opinion, makes the system stay in
the vicinity of xsk for a finite time, and eventually escape
and hit the positive extremist consensus state xM = 1.
p-3
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The time spent near the saddle point is related to the
time to reach a consensus in orientation (all states with
the same sign) and, as we show in the next section, is
non-monotonic in r.
Convergence times. – In Fig. 4 we plot the mean
time τ to reach the final extremist consensus x±M = 1
as a function of r for M = 5, obtained from MC simu-
lations. As qualitative results only depend on r we took
q = 1 − p, thus r = p/(1 − p) varies from 0 to ∞ as p
goes from 0 to 1. Therefore, r can be seen as the relative
strength of persuasion, as compared to compromise. We
observe that τ is non-monotonic in r, and has a minimum
value around r ≃ 0.6. This means that the population
reaches the fastest consensus when interactions between
agents of the same orientation have a probability of success
p similar to that of opposite-orientation agents q. Instead,
mostly chatting with same-opinion partners (large r) re-
inforce initial believes, leading to a polarized state that
last for very long times. Besides, only interacting with
opposite-opinion partners (small r) first induces a central-
ized consensus, which is unstable, and then the population
is slowly driven to the final extremist consensus.
10-2 10-1 100 101
r 
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Fig. 4: Main: mean extremist consensus time τ vs persuasion
strength r = p/(1 − p) for M = 5 and N = 1000. Inset:
rescaled time τ vs r in log-log scale forM = 3 (squares),M = 5
(circles) and M = 8 (diamonds). The solid line corresponds to
the approximation (9) in the r ≪ 1 limit, while dashed lines
denote the asymptotic behavior rM in the r ≫ 1 limit.
An insight about the non-monotonic behavior of τ can
be obtained by means of Eqs. (1). For a simpler analysis of
the equations and a better understanding of the previous
results, it proves convenient to split the evolution of the
system into two distinct stages - a first stage with an as-
sociated time scale τ1, in which all agents adopt the same
opinion-orientation (all states are either positive or nega-
tive), and a second stage where the system reaches extrem-
ist consensus, characterized by a time scale τ2. Therefore,
the convergence time can be written as τ = τ1 + τ2. The
non-linearity of Eqs. (1) makes it hard to find a complete
solution, but it is possible to obtain approximate expres-
sions for τ in the two limiting cases of very strong and
very weak persuasion.
Small persuasion limit r ≪ 1. In this limit, the sec-
ond stage is much longer than the first stage (τ2 ≫ τ1),
and we can approximate τ ≃ τ2. This is because once all
agents’ states become positive (negative) they are slowly
driven by persuasion events - which happen with a very
small probability p = r/(1 + r) - to the consensus state
xM = 1 (x-M = 1), thus the system spends most of the
time in the second stage. To estimate τ2 we assume,
without loss of generality, that the system starts at time
t = 0 from a configuration in which all states are positive
[xk(t = 0) = 0 ∀ k < 0]. This initial condition implies
that states remain positive since only persuasive events
can take place, and thus σ+(t) = 1 and σ−(t) = 0 for
t ≥ 0. Then, Eqs. (1) become linear
dx1
dt′
= −x1
dxk
dt′
= xk−1 − xk for 2 ≤ k ≤M − 1 (4)
dxM
dt′
= xM-1,
where we have introduced the rescaled time t′ ≡ 2 p t. In
the Laplace space, Eqs. (4) are reduced to the following
system of coupled algebraic equations:
s x1(s)− x1(0) = −x1(s)
s xk(s)− xk(0) = xk−1(s)− xk(s) 2 ≤ k ≤M − 1
s xM(s)− xM(0) = xM-1(s),
with solutions
xk(s) =
k−1∑
n=0
xk−n(0)
(s+ 1)n+1
for 1 ≤ k ≤M − 1
xM(s) =
xM(0)
s
+
1
s
M−2∑
n=0
xk−n(0)
(s+ 1)n+1
.
Transforming back to the original space and replacing t′
by 2 p t we finally obtain
xk(t) = e
−2p t
k−1∑
n=0
(2p t)n xk−n(0)
n!
1 ≤ k ≤M − 1
xM(t) = 1− e
−2p t
M−1∑
k=1
k−1∑
n=0
(2p t)n xk−n(0)
n!
. (5)
The above solutions are valid for all values of r, but we
explore here their behavior in the r ≪ 1 limit. In this case
we expect an initial distribution of states peaked at k = 1,
that is, x1(0) ≃ 1 and xk(0) ≃ 0 for 2 ≤ k ≤ M . This
is because the strong bias towards the center during the
first stage keeps most states close to k = 1. Then, Eq. (5)
becomes
xM(t) ≃ 1− e
−2p t
M−2∑
k=0
(2p t)k
k!
, (6)
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which shows that xM approaches 1 quasi-exponentially fast
with time. Having xM > 1 − 1/N at a time t = τ2 is
equivalent to an extremist consensus in the discrete system
of N agents, since this corresponds to have a number of
agents in state M larger than N − 1. Therefore, from
Eq. (6) τ2 obeys the following relation
N e−2p τ2
M−2∑
k=0
(2p τ2)
k
k!
= 1. (7)
Then, τ2 = fM,N/2p, where fM,N is a solution of
Ne−f
M−2∑
k=0
fk/k!− 1 = 0, (8)
a non-trivial function ofM and N . Finally, replacing back
p = r/(1 + r) we arrive to following expression for τ
τ ≃ τ2 ≃
(1 + r)fM,N
2r
. (9)
In the inset of Fig. 4 we show the curves τ vs r from MC
simulations in a system of size N = 1000, and rescaled by
the functions f ≃ 9.233, 13.062 and 18.062, for M = 3, 5
and 8, respectively. These values of f were obtained by
numerically solving Eq. (8), given that a closed expression
for f in terms of M and N is very hard to obtain. The
collapse of the three curves confirm the scaling given by
Eq. (9), which also captures the r → 0 asymptotic behav-
ior r−1 observed from simulations.
Large persuasion r ≫ 1 limit. In this case, the first
stage takes much longer than the second stage, and thus
τ ≃ τ1. The system quickly becomes polarized by the
driving bias towards the extreme states k = ±M , and
stays polarized for very long times, given that the flux of
particles from one side to the other is limited by the very
small compromise probability q = 1/(1 + r). To estimate
τ1, it proves useful to work with the magnetization m,
defined as the difference between the fraction of positive
and negative states
m(t) ≡ σ+(t)− σ−(t) = 2
M∑
k=1
xk(t)− 1. (10)
From Eqs. (1), the magnetization evolves according to
dm
dt
= 4 q (x−1σ+ − x1σ−), (11)
or, using the relations σ± = (1±m)/2, is
dm
dt
= 2 q [x−1(1 +m)− x1(1 −m)] . (12)
Equation (11) can also be obtained by noting that m only
changes after a compromise event that involves states 1
or −1. The first term accounts for −1 → 1 transitions
due to compromises between agents with states −1 and
k > 0, which happen at a rate 2 x−1 σ+, increasing m
by 2/N . The second term stems for the reverse transi-
tion 1 → −1, where m decreases. Equation (12) is not
closed because x±1 depend on x±2, which in turn depend
on x±3 and so on, as we observe from Eqs. (1). However,
we can still close the equation by finding approximate ex-
pressions for x±1 in terms of m, as we detail below. As
we showed before, the distribution of opinions at the qua-
sistationary mixed state follows the exponential relation
xs±k = x
s
±1 r
k−1 (1 ≤ k ≤ M). Monte Carlo simulations
show that the distribution remains exponential during the
first stage, x±k(t) = x±1(t)α
k−1
± (t), where α±(t) are time-
dependent variables. Interestingly, we have numerically
checked that α±(t) are almost constant over time, and
only a significant change is observed at the very end of
the stage. Therefore, they can be considered as slow vari-
ables, as compared tom, and taken as constants and equal
to their initial values α±(t) ≃ α±(0). Thus, we can write
σ± =
1±m
2
≃ x±1(t)
M∑
k=1
αk−1± (0) = x±1(t)
[
1− αM± (0)
1− α±(0)
]
,
from where
x±1(t) ≃
[1− α±(0)]
2[1− αM± (0)]
[1±m(t)]. (13)
Given that the quasistationary state is reached in a fast
time scale that is O(1) [see Fig. 2(a)], we neglect this
short transient and assume that the initial condition cor-
responds to the stationary solution Eq. (3). Therefore,
from Eq. (13), the initial variables α±(0) obey
[1− α±(0)]
2[1− αM± (0)]
≃
xs1
1±m0
, (14)
where m0 = m(0) is the initial magnetization, and x
s
1 =
(1−r)/2(1−rM) is the state-1 density at the quasistation-
ary state [Eq. (2)]. Note that starting from the perfectly
symmetric mixed state gives m0 = 0, and thus α±(0) = r.
From Eqs. (13) and (14) we get
x±1(t) ≃
xs1
1±m0
[1±m(t)]. (15)
Plugging this expression for x±1 into Eq. (12) leads to
dm(t)
dt
≃
4 q xs1m0
1−m20
[1−m(t)2]. (16)
The integration of Eq. (16) gives
m(t) ≃
(1 +m0)e
At − (1−m0)e
−At
(1 +m0)eAt + (1−m0)e−At
, (17)
where
A ≡
4 q xs1 m0
1−m20
=
2(1− r)m0
(1 + r)(1 − rM )(1 −m20)
(18)
p-5
C. E. La Rocca et al.
is the prefactor of Eq. (16). Expression (17) captures
the qualitative behavior of the magnetization, which ap-
proaches to |m| = 1 as
|m(t)| ≃ 1−
2(1− |m0|)
(1 + |m0|)
e−2|A|t. (19)
Within this framework of rate equations, the first stage
ends at a time τ1 when |m| equals 1− 1/N , that is, when
less than one particle remains in one of the two sides. From
Eq. (19) we obtain
τ ≃ τ1 ≃
(1−m20)(1 + r)(1 − r
M )
4 |m0| (1− r)
ln
[
2N(1− |m0|)
1 + |m0|
]
.
(20)
The scaling τ ∼ rM gives the right asymptotic behavior
for r ≫ 1 (inset of Fig. 4).
Summary and Conclusions. – In summary, we pro-
posed and studied a model that incorporates two mech-
anisms for the formation of opinions - compromise and
persuasion. Compromise interactions between individu-
als tend to moderate their opinions, while persuasive con-
tacts lead to extreme positions. When compromise events
are more frequent than persuasive events, opinions are
grouped around moderate values, leading to a centralized
state of opinions. In the opposite case, if persuasion events
dominate over compromise events, opinions are driven to-
wards extreme positive and negative values, inducing po-
larization. The centralized and polarized states are unsta-
ble, and consensus in either positive or negative extreme
opinions is eventually achieved. For a symmetric initial
distribution of opinions, these final extremist states are
equiprobable, but any asymmetry in the initial condition
that favors a given opinion orientation makes the popula-
tion reach consensus in the extreme state of the favored
orientation. The mean extremist consensus time τ is non-
monotonic in the ratio r = p/q between the probabili-
ties of successful persuasive and compromise events, and
has a minimum when p and q are of the same order of
magnitude. In the small (r ≪ 1) and large (r ≫ 1) per-
suasion limit, the consensus time scales as τ ∼ r−1 and
τ ∼ rM lnN , respectively, with the maximum intensity M
and population size N .
In the studied model, individuals reinforce their opin-
ions by talking to other partners with the same opinion
orientation. It would worth while to explore some ex-
tensions that include a reinforcement mechanism between
individuals with opposite orientations. Related to that,
it was recently found that a rejection rule between very
dissimilar individuals enhances polarization [18].
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